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And Now for Something 
Completely Different 
An Alternative Model of Trade, 
Education, and Inequality 
Paul Krugman 
The dramatic growth of  U.S. wage  inequality since the early  1970s has 
been the subject of intense controversy both among economists and be- 
tween economists and the broader public. To  many people-including  a 
few  economists (e.g., Learner  1998)-the  explanation of  that increased 
dispersion seems obvious: It is the result of globalization, and specifically 
of the growing imports of labor-intensive manufactures from developing 
countries. However,  there are serious difficulties with an explanation of 
growing inequality that places the main weight on trade. For one thing, 
despite recent growth the value of north-south  trade is  still fairly small 
compared with the GDP of advanced economies; this means that even a 
complete elimination of that trade would, given reasonable estimates of 
factor shares and elasticities of substitution, reverse only a fraction of the 
observed change in wage differentials (Krugman  1995). Moreover, while 
trade can raise the relative demand for skilled labor by shifting the produc- 
tion mix toward skill-intensive sectors, in reality most of the rise in the 
relative employment of highly educated workers hds taken place not via a 
change in the sectoral mix, but via a shift toward such workers within 
sectors-a  shift that has taken place despite a sharp rise in education pre- 
mia, which should have induced firms to substitute workers who were not 
college educated (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993). 
But if globalization didn’t do it, what did? An explanation that is consis- 
tent with the data is skill-biased technologcal change, taking place simul- 
taneously in many sectors (and also presumably in many countries). And 
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this is in fact the explanation that has been advanced by  a number of 
economists, myself included, as the best available answer. 
Yet even among those economists who believe that skill-biased techno- 
logical change is the best explanation we have for the growing wage gap- 
certainly a better explanation than globalization-there  is widespread un- 
easiness. This uneasiness stems both from the indirect nature of the evi- 
dence for such change-it  is essentially inferred from the fact that the 
relative wages and the relative employment of the highly educated have 
moved in the same direction-and  from the sense that technology is too 
much of a deus ex machina, something invoked to tie up the loose ends in 
our story rather than something we  believe in on its own merits. I know 
that I am not alone in wondering whether all of us-both  those who insist 
that globalization must be the explanation and those of us who regard the 
evidence against a simple Stolper-Samuelson account as overwhelming- 
are missing something, whether we may not all be on the wrong track. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer a suggestive example of how a 
process quite distinct from either the simple trade or the simple technology 
story might be central to understanding growing inequality. The basic idea 
is that the labor market might, over some range of conditions, be charac- 
terized by multiple, locally stable equilibria, some more egalitarian than 
others. If that is the case, unequalizing shocks of modest  size-shocks 
that could originate either in changing trade opportunities or in changing 
technology, or for that matter in both-could  push the economy out of 
an egalitarian equilibrium and thus set in motion a cumulative process of 
growing inequality. In  the specific model  presented  here, that  process, 
which essentially feeds on itself, could easily be misinterpreted as exoge- 
nous skill-biased technical change. 
The particular mechanism generating multiple equilibria in this model 
is  a version of the screeninglsignaling hypothesis (Spence 1971; Stiglitz 
1975). This approach was taken because it is the simplest labor market 
model with the required characteristics. It may, however, be only one of a 
number of possible mechanisms. For example, recent work by Acemoglu 
(1996), which is in somewhat the same spirit, offers a quite different mech- 
anism involving technology choice in a frictional search model of the labor 
market. As we will see, there are some empirical difficulties with the spe- 
cific model presented here; thus it should be considered only as a first 
exploration of a class of “exotic” income distribution models that might 
turn out to recast the nature of the debate. 
The remainder  of this paper is in five parts. Section  1.1 lays out the 
assumptions of the model. Section 1.2 develops the crucial idea of a dis- 
tinction between two labor market regimes. Section 1.3 then shows how 
small shocks can precipitate a shift from one regime to the other, and 
thereby produce a cumulative process of growing inequality; it also shows 
how such a process might confuse someone trying to interpret the data. An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality  17 
Section I .4 discusses some empirical predictions of the model, contrasting 
them  with  the  predictions of  alternative approaches and  testing them 
loosely against the data. Finally, section 1.5 suggests some qualifications, 
extensions, and implications of the type of analysis this model represents. 
1.1  Assumptions of the Model 
We consider an economy endowed with two kinds of labor, “good” (G) 
and “bad” (B).  The difference between these two kinds of workers is as- 
sumed to be inherent and unalterable. A worker’s type is  known to the 
worker himself but is unobservable to employers. 
Good workers do, however, have a way to demonstrate their goodness: 
They can acquire a college degree. It is assumed that only good workers 
are capable of acquiring such a degree, so the possession of a degree proves 
that a worker is of type G.  However,  acquiring a degree is costly. Rather 
than explicitly model this cost, I will  simply assume that G workers will 
choose to become educated if and only if  the ratio of the wage of those 
with degrees to those without,w,/  w,,  exceeds some value r > 1. 
There are also two kinds of jobs: managerial (&I)  and nonmanagerial 
(N).  M jobs actually require a college degree-that  is, such a job can only 
be filled by a good worker with an education. In Njobs, there is no advan- 
tage in being educated per se. However, good workers are known to be 
T > 1 times as productive in N jobs as bad workers, so that even in N 
employment a worker with a college degree-who  is therefore certified as 
type G-will  command a higher wage than one without a degree. 
Aside from this asymmetric-information feature of  the labor market, 
the economy may be described by the standard two-by-two model of trade 
theory. There  are two  sectors, manager-intensive X  and  nonmanager- 
intensive  I: All  individuals are assumed to share the same homothetic 
preferences over the two goods: 
Production in each is described by a constant-returns function of manag- 
ers and nonmanagers with all the usual properties: 
(2)  Q,  =  X(M,,N,), 
(3)  Qy  =  Y(My,Ny). 
In these production  functions, M  is  simply the number  of  college- 
educated good workers employed as managers. N, however, must be mea- 
sured in efficiency units because each good worker employed in  a non- 
managerial role contributes -rr  times as much as each bad worker. Thus 
the resource constraints for the economy are 18  Paul Krugman 
(4)  M  =  Mx +  My =  G,, 
(5)  N =  N, +  N, =  TG,  +  B, 
where G,  is the number of good workers employed as managers, and G, 
is the number employed in nonmanagerial positions. 
Finally, this is an open economy. It is not, however, a small open econ- 
omy  facing  given  world  prices.  Instead,  it  faces  a  less-than-perfectly- 
elastic rest-of-world offer curve. There are two reasons for using this large- 
open-economy setup. One is that it is arguably considerably more realistic 
than the price-taking assumption-for  the United States alone, and cer- 
tainly if we think of ourselves as modeling the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development as a whole. More to the point for this pa- 
per, however, the large-economy setup is, for reasons that will  soon be- 
come apparent, more convenient as a modeling device. 
We  will  represent the rest-of-world offer curve by  assuming that the 
relative price of Xis decreasing in net exports of X 
D 
'x  =  D(Q, - 
D 
This completes the statement of the model. Next we turn to analysis. 
1.2  Labor Market Regimes 
In order to analyze this model, we  need to determine the relationship 
between the number of good workers who acquire a college education- 
which we  will denote by H-and  the payoff of such an education, which 
we  measure by the ratio of college to noncollege wages, w,/w,. 
The nature of that relationship depends on the regime in the labor mar- 
ket, which can take one of two forms. First, it may be the case that college- 
educated workers are employed only in managerial positions-that  is, in 
jobs for which such an education is actually necessary, in which education 
is actually socially productive.  1 will refer to this as the human capital 
regime. Alternatively, it may be the case that some college-educated work- 
ers are employed in nonmanagerial jobs. By  assumption, the education 
does not enhance their productivity in these jobs; its only function is to 
demonstrate to employers that they are good as opposed to bad workers. 
I will refer to this as the quality signaling regime-although  we must bear 
in mind that even under this regime there will be workers whose education 
actually is socially productive. 
Before we  determine the conditions under which each regime prevails, 
let us examine the behavior of the economy under each. Under the human 
capital regime, the number of college-educated workers is the same as the An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality  19 
number of managers, and the remaining workers form the supply of N in 
efficiency units: 
(7)  M  =  H, 
(8)  N  =  T(G - H)  +  B. 
In terms of production and prices, then, the human capital regime consti- 
tutes an ordinary two-by-two economy, in which increases in the number of 
college-educated workers amount to an increase in A4 and a decline in N. 
The properties of  such an economy are very familiar. In particular, 
imagine either increasing M  or decreasing N  at constant relative goods 
prices. In either case, the economy would experience a Rybczynski effect: 
The output of M-intensive X would rise and the output of  N-intensive Y 
fall. This would lead, at unchanged relative prices, to an increase in the 
excess supply of X.  But given the rest-of-world offer curve (6), this means 
a decline in the relative price of X.  So we may think in terms of a reduced- 
form relationship between the number  of college-educated workers and 
relative prices: 
(9)  5  =  F(H). 
PY 
But  in  such  a  two-by-two  economy  there  is  also  a  direct  Stolper- 
Samuelson relationship between relative goods prices and relative factor 
prices. Thus we can write a reduced-form relationship between Hand rela- 
tive wages of the form 
!?+K  =  4(H), 
WN 
4’ <  0. 
We are not, however, quite there yet. Equation (10) gives the ratio of the 
wage per manager (which is also the wage of any college graduate) to the 
wage per efficiency unit of nonmanagerial labor. However, because some 
of the workers in nonmanagerial jobs are (unidentified) type G, the average 
number of efficiency units per N  worker is more than one; so the wage 
paid per actual worker in N jobs is 
T(G - H) + B 
G-H+B 
w,  =  WN 
Notice that the ratio of wL  to w, is decreasing in H. The reason is that the 
more G workers who acquire college educations, the lower the expected 
productivity  of the average worker without  a degree. This complicates 
matters in the human capital regime, but is  central to the story in the 
quality signaling regime. 20  Paul Krugman 
The education premium as a function of H is therefore 
G-H+B  wH= 
WL  (b(H)~(G  - H)  + B’ 
This  relationship  can,  in  principle,  be  either  downward-  or upward- 
sloping. It will be downward-sloping  if  the effect of factor supplies on 
relative prices is  strong (this effect would be nonexistent, of course, in 
a price-taking economy-which  is why the large-economy assumption is 
useful) and if the screening effect is weak. I will assume that this is in fact 
the case, so that the curve relating w,Iw,  to H in the human capital regime 
looks like curve HC in figure 1.1. 
It may be useful at this stage to give a specific example. Suppose that 
we  consider a closed economy-the  limiting case of a large open econ- 
omy-in  which both tastes and technology are Cobb-Douglas. Let F be 
the share of X in expenditure, and let a  and p be the share of M in the 
X  and  Y sectors, respectively. It follows immediately that a share pa + 
(1 - p)p of total income accrues to M and a share ~(1  -  a)  + (1 -  F) 
(1 -  p) to N, so that 
*=  Pa+  (1 - PIP 
w,N  F(1 - a)  + (1 - P)(1 - PI’ 
(13) 
and thus 
(14)  YK  = 
Now substituting in equation (1 l), we find that 
T(G - H)  +  B 
H 
=K 
Fa+ (1-  PIP  N 
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(1 5) 
%=K G-H+B 
WL  H’ 
which is unambiguously a downward-sloping curve. 
Next let us turn to the quality signaling regime. This is more straightfor- 
ward. Since (some) college-educated workers are competing directly with 
non-college-educated workers, each college-educated worker will receive a 
wage equal to r times the wage per efficiency unit in N, while each noncol- 
lege worker will  receive a wage proportional  to the average number  of 
efficiency units among such workers. But the total number of  efficiency 
units among noncollege workers is 
(16)  E  =  T(G - H)  +  B, 
so the average efficiency is 
-  E  - T(G- H)+  B  - 
L  G-H+B ’ 
implying the relative wage equation, 
G-  H+  B  -  wH  =  r 
WL  r(G- H)+  B’ 
which is unambiguously upward-sloping, yielding a curve like QS in fig- 
ure 1.1. 
Which regime prevails? The answer, of course, is whichever provides the 
higher relative wage. If the HC curve lies above the QS curve for some 
given H,  college graduates can command higher wages in managerial than 
in nonmanagerial jobs, even if all graduates are so employed; so no col- 
lege-educated workers will use their education purely to demonstrate their 
type. If HC lies below QS, then if all graduates worked as managers they 
would earn less than a certified good worker could get in a nonmanagerial 
job, and so some H workers will shift away from the managerial role. The 
overall relationship between Hand w,IwL,  then, is V-shaped; it is defined 
by the upper envelope of the curves HC and QS. 
1.3  Equilibria and Transitions 
Let us now endogenize the supply of college-educated workers. We have 
assumed that good workers will  find it worthwhile to acquire a college 
education if and only if wHIwL  exceeds some value r > 1. Thus in figure 1.1, 
which represents the most interesting case, the solid line (the upper envelope 
of the HC and QS curves) represents the demand for college graduates, 
while the broken horizontal line at w,Iw,  = r represents the supply. 
Clearly, there are three equilibria: one at point 1, where only some good 22  Paul Krugman 
workers get degrees and the labor market is in a human capital regime; 
one at point  3, where all those who can get degrees do and the quality 
signaling regime prevails; and  an intermediate equilibrium  at  point  2. 
Which equilibrium does the economy select? For some purposes it would 
be essential to model the full-fledged dynamics of educational investment, 
including the formation of expectations about future returns. However, in 
recent years the interest in evolutionary game theory suddenly has made 
ad hoc dynamics, in which the mix of strategies followed by a population 
gradually changes depending on the current returns to each strategy, re- 
spectable again. Such evolutionary dynamics are particularly useful when, 
as in this model, there are multiple equilibria and we  are looking for a 
selection criterion. Or to make a long story short, it is acceptable as a first 
cut to assume that the number of college-educated good workers rises if 
w,Iw,  > r, and falls if  w,Iw,  < r. The equilibrium at point 2 is,  then, 
unstable, while the other equilibria are locally stable. Alternatively, if one 
thinks of the strategy of good workers as probabilistic (e.g., with what 
probability will  I go to college?), then points  1 and 3 are evolutionarily 
stable strategies in the sense of Maynard Smith (1982), while point 2 is not. 
Where the economy ends up, then, depends on history. In particular, if 
it manages to get into the relatively egalitarian equilibrium at point  1, it 
will tend to stay there in the face of small shocks. 
But now suppose that there is a progressive rise in the demand for man- 
agerial workers. This rise could  be due either to growing opportunities 
to export the manager-intensive good X,  or to manager-biased technical 
change. In either case, the effect under the human capital regime will be 
to increase the relative wage of H workers for any given level of H, an 
upward shift in the HC curve. 
As long as this shift is not too large, the labor market will remain in the 
human capital regime, and the wage differential will not change. At a crit- 
ical point, however, illustrated in figure 1.1 by the curve HC', the human 
capital equilibrium will  cease to exist. At this point, even if  there is no 
further increase in the demand for managerial workers, the economy will 
continue evolving toward increasing inequality. As a growing fraction of 
good workers become educated, the expected productivity and thus the 
wages of non-college-educated workers will fall, further increasing the in- 
centive to acquire a degree, continuing until the unequal equilibrium at 
point 3 has been reached. 
Two observations need to be made about this transition to higher in- 
equality. The first is that if anything like this story is right, the whole at- 
tempt to apportion the causes of growing wage differentials between tech- 
nology and trade may be missing the point. Either trade or technology- 
or more likely both-may  push the economy to the critical point, but there- 
after the unequalizing process simply feeds on itself, and the proximate 
cause may therefore be irrelevant. 
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terpreted by an observer-me,  for example-who  works with the wrong 
model. Suppose that exogenous forces in fact were to push HC just to the 
critical point and that  the economy were then to evolve spontaneously 
from point 2 to point 3. What would we see? Because of the strong struc- 
ture of this model, we  can immediately determine that there will be no 
change at all in the wages of managers relative to the cost of one efficiency 
unit of nonmanagerial work. We know this because all college graduates 
under the quality signaling regime receive a wage equivalent to T  units of 
N. But if  these true relative factor prices are unchanged, relative goods 
prices must also remain unchanged, and so therefore must production, 
consumption, and trade. Nothing real changes as the economy moves from 
point 2 to point 3, except the distribution of  wages. 
But an observer who classifies labor not by unobservable quality but by 
education level will see two things happening: a fall in both the relative 
and the absolute wages of non-college-educated workers, and a fall in their 
relative employment. This seemingly perverse outcome will not appear to 
be explained by trade-neither  the volume of trade nor the prices at which 
trade takes place will change, nor will the industry mix of employment; 
all of the increased demand for H and reduced demand for non-H will 
therefore come from within-sector  shifts. The only hypothesis that will 
appear to be consistent with the data will therefore be skill-biased techni- 
cal change-even  though no technical change has in fact taken place! 
1.4  Empirical Implications 
At the beginning of this paper, I described some reasons why even those 
of us who have provisionally adopted a technology story for growing wage 
inequality nonetheless feel uneasy. But beyond gut feelings, is there some 
way to distinguish among the alternative explanations of inequality? 
Suppose for a moment that we  try to explain rising wage differentials 
with one of three pure stories: Stolper-Samuelson effects with no change 
in technology, skill-biased technological change with no change in factor 
supplies, and a pure story about transition from a human capital to a 
quality signaling regime (that is, the movement from point 2 to point 3 in 
figure 1.1). In reality, of course, there is no reason why the data should be 
generated by a pure story; but this comparison is nonetheless illuminating. 
Let us, therefore, compare the implications for three observable variables. 
Skill Intensity within Industries.  The original exposition  of Stolper and 
Samuelson relied on the device of a contract curve within an Edgeworth 
box to make the now familiar, although sometimes still misunderstood, 
point that trade affects the demand for factors via its effect on the industry 
mix; in their analysis, a rise in the relative price of the labor-intensive good 
causes employment to shift toward that good. Full employment of factors 
is preserved via a compensating shift toward capital-intensive techniques 24  PaulKrugman 
within each sector. Thus in a pure Stolper-Samuelson account of rising 
wage differentials, we would expect to see the skill intensity of production 
falling within each industry. 
Skill-biased technological change, in contrast, would tend to raise the 
relative demand for skilled labor within each industry. If we  take factor 
supplies as given, however, the skill premium would have to rise enough 
to choke off this shift in relative demand in the aggregate; while the precise 
effects on each industry would depend on both the distribution of techno- 
logical change and the elasticity of substitution, on average there would 
be no change in skill intensity within industries. (Of course, if we imagine 
that  relative  supplies of  skilled labor are increasing  at  the same time, 
changes in factor prices would be less and we would therefore see increases 
in skill intensity within industries.) 
Finally, in the transition from a human capital to a quality signaling 
regime, nothing real would change, but firms in both sectors would begin 
to employ college-educated workers for previously unskilled jobs; thus the 
observed skill intensity would rise in all sectors. 
Factor Prices. It is a fundamental proposition in trade theory that follow- 
ing a change in relative prices, the bundle of  factors initially employed 
must be at least able to afford the goods they were previously producing. 
(This proposition is the basis for the demonstration of gains from trade in 
terms of the dual; see Helpman and Krugman  1985, chap.  1.) Thus, a 
Stolper-Samuelson explanation of changing factor prices implies that the 
purchasing power of the original employment of factors in terms of output 
(or, given the absence of strong terms of trade effects, in terms of con- 
sumption) must rise or at least not fall. 
The same is a fortiori true of an explanation in terms of technological 
change: Technological progress must increase the purchasing power of the 
initial bundle of factors for any given goods prices, and any change in 
goods prices can only further increase that purchasing power. 
A pure transition from a human capital to a quality signaling regime, 
however, actually reduces the purchasing power of the initial bundle of 
factors, if workers are classified by education. In the transition from point 
2 to point 3 in figure 1.1, neither the average wage rate nor the wage rate 
of skilled workers changes; but the wage rate of workers without a college 
education falls. Thus an index with fixed weights on the college-educated 
and non-college-educated wage will unambiguously decline. 
Total Factor Productivity. Roughly speaking, this is dual to the measure- 
ment of factor purchasing power. If total factor productivity (TFP) is prop- 
erly measured, it should not change at all in a pure Stolper-Samuelson 
story. It should, of course, rise if there is technological progress, so it must 
increase in a technology-driven account. Again, a transition from a hu- 
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tion if labor types are measured by  education: There will be an increase 
in human capital but no increase in output, so TFP will  (as measured) 
actually fall. 
We  may  therefore  summarize  the predictions  of  the two  standard ap- 
proaches to inequality and of the exotic alternative offered here in table 1.1. 
What do we observe in practice? It is a familiar point since the work of 
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) that in the United States there has been a 
pervasive shift toward higher skill intensity within industries, with rela- 
tively little shift of the industry mix of employment toward skill-intensive 
products. Thus on this first criterion, the two conventional approaches 
seem to fail (although the technology-driven story can be rescued by sup- 
posing that factor supplies have exogenously shifted, albeit not as rapidly 
as factor demands). 
When we come to the purchasing power of factors, what we observe for 
the United  States over the period  of rising inequality  is  a slow rise in 
average real wages (returns on capital are more problematic to measure). 
However, this rise in real wages has been accompanied by a rising average 
educational level, so that it is unclear whether the real income of the initial 
basket of factors has increased. Table 1.2 presents a calculation using data 
from Mishel(l996). The first column shows the 1979 share of workers by 
educational category; since the total does not add up to 100, the second 
column prorates the difference to derive an adjusted share. The third col- 
umn shows the real hourly wage rate (in 1996 dollars) of each worker type 
in  1979; the fourth the real wage in  1989. As the last line of the table 
indicates, according to these numbers the average real wage weighted by 
Table 1.1  Predictions of Alternative Approaches Based on Change 
Skill Intensity  Purchasing Power  Total Factor 
within Industries  of Initial Factors  Productivity 
Stolper-Samuelson  Negative  Non-negative  Zero 
Skill-biased technology  None  Positive  Positive 
Transition to screening  Positive  Negative  Negative 
Table 1.2  Real Wages of a Constant-Skill Basket 
1979 Share of  Adjusted  Real Wage,  Real Wage, 
Workforce  Share  1979  1989 
Non-high  school  28.5  29.2  10.59  8.91 
High school  41.7  42.7  11.86  10.79 
Some college  15.1  15.5  12.92  12.53 
College  8.8  9.0  16.55  16.98 
Advanced degree  3.6  3.7  20.34  22.07 
Weighted average  12.39  11.48 26  Paul Krugman 
Table 1.3  Factors Accounting for U.S. Growth 
Output per  Capital per  Human Capital  Total Factor 
Worker  Worker  per Worker  Productivity 
1960-94  1.1  0.4  0.4  0.3 
1960-73  1.9  0.5  0.6  0.8 
1973-94  0.6  0.3  0.2  0.1 
1973-84  0.2  0.3  0.5  -0.5 
1984-94  0.9  0.3  0.0  0.7 
1979 labor force composition actually declined approximately 7 percent 
during the decade of the 1980s. While this rough calculation might not 
stand up in the face of a careful cleaning up of the data, it is remarkable 
that such a fixed-weight wage index falls despite technological progress, a 
roughly constant labor share in GDP, and stable or improving terms of 
trade. The result is,  at least  on the face of it, inconsistent  either with 
Stolper-Samuelson or technology-driven stories; it is consistent with the 
transition to a screening equilibrium. 
As one might expect given its rough conceptual equivalence, calcula- 
tions of total factor productivity yield similarly puzzling results. Table 1.3 
shows a typical recent calculation from Collins and Bosworth (1996); it 
suggests that during the post-1  973 period, despite what looks like continu- 
ing technological advance, growth in total factor productivity ground to 
a near halt. Again, a possible, although not necessarily correct, explana- 
tion is that the accumulation  of human capital over that period repre- 
sented a socially unproductive investment in screening. 
To me, at least, this rough evidence clearly indicates not only the well- 
established point  that  Stolper-Samuelson effects cannot have  been the 
main driving force behind changes in the wage distribution, but also that 
something funny is going on  that  is not easily mapped  into a  simple 
technology-driven story either. In particular, the aggregative implications 
of the transition to screening seem to fit the actual data quite well. 
However, we should note that there is one important implication of the 
particular type of model developed here that appears to be contradicted 
by the data. If the multiple equilibria arise only because workers are better 
sorted by quality than they used to be, one ought to observe a difference 
in the growth of inequality by cohort: The skill premium for workers from 
older cohorts, who made educational decisions at a time when screening 
motives were not as important, should not have increased at the same rate 
as that for more recent cohorts (i.e., a worker who chose not to go to 
college in 1960 revealed less about himself than a worker making the same 
choice in 1975). In fact, however, cohort studies (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and 
Pierce 1993) suggest comparable increases in inequality across cohorts. An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality  27 
1.5  Qualifications, Extensions, and Implications 
It should go without saying that the model proposed here is very special, 
and that there are good reasons to be skeptical about the mechanism pro- 
posed. In general, signalingkcreening models of the labor market  have 
been questioned by many labor economists who wonder why employers 
would not attempt to create cheaper sorting mechanisms and spare good 
workers the huge expense of pointless college attendance. More generally, 
this model suggests that what looks like skill-biased technological change 
might actually be something else; but then again it might be skill-biased 
change after all. 
On the other hand, the mechanism described here is only one of a class 
of possible positive-feedback stories about growing inequality. As men- 
tioned in section 1.1, Acemoglu (1 996) offers an alternative story roughly 
along the following lines. In a search economy, in which neither firms nor 
workers  can  expect  to  find  an immediate  match,  firms  must  choose 
whether to implement  a technology that is  highly productive  only if  a 
skilled worker uses it, or a more robust technology that any worker can 
use. Firms will have an incentive to implement the skill-sensitive technol- 
ogy if they can quickly find skilled workers, so the demand curve for such 
workers will be upward- rather than downward-sloping. (This story does 
not suffer from the objection that it should apply only to younger cohorts 
of workers.) Other economists have suggested that since the power of an 
individual union  depends in  part  on the  strength of  a national  union 
movement, the dramatic decline in union membership in the United States 
in recent decades may represent a self-reinforcing process contributing to 
inequality. One might even invoke linkages that run through the political 
economy of policy; for example, Benabou (1996) has proposed that, over 
some range, increased inequality tends to lead to policies that reinforce 
that inequality. And no doubt there are other possible mechanisms to be 
considered-nor  need such stories be mutually exclusive. 
If anything like the mechanism proposed in this paper is indeed at work, 
the policy implications cut sharply across all current orthodoxies. Con- 
sider, for example, the implications for trade policy. It is possible in this 
kind of model that globalization could be the proximate cause of a process 
that then gives the false appearance of being driven by  exogenous skill- 
biased technical change. This does not mean, however, that the process 
could be reversed by reversing the globalization: Even if trade tipped the 
balance and undermined the human capital equilibrium, once the econ- 
omy is in a quality signaling equilibrium, a small downward shift in the 
HC curve will  not push it out again. So one could blame trade for in- 
creased inequality, yet at the same time conclude that protectionism can- 
not do much to reduce wage differentials. 28  Paul Krugman 
Or consider the popular proposals of Reich (1991) and others to combat 
inequality by promoting the acquisition of human capital-in  effect, by 
subsidizing education. In this model, such policies would be completely 
ineffective once the economy is  in the quality signaling regime. Indeed, 
they could actually be counterproductive if an economy is still in a human 
capital regime, but close to the critical point: Anything that encourages 
good workers to get educated can set in motion a cumulative process of 
growing inequality! 
In short, while the specific model presented in this paper is implausible 
in its details, it may be very important as a practical matter to contemplate 
the possibility that the real causes of growing inequality are very different 
from any of the explanations that have dominated recent debate. 
References 
Acemoglu, D.  1996. Changes in unemployment and wage inequality: An alterna- 
tive theory and some evidence. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Mimeograph. 
Benabou, R. 1996. Inequality and growth. In NBER  macroeconomics annual 1996, 
ed. B.  Bernanke and J. Rotemberg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Collins, S., and B. Bosworth. 1996. Economic growth in East Asia. Brookings Pa- 
pers on Economic Activity, no. 2: 135-91. 
Helpman, E., and P.  Krugman. 1985. Market  structure andforeign trade. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Juhn, C., K. M. Murphy, and  B.  Pierce.  1993. Wage inequality and the rise in 
returns to skills. Journal of Political Economy 101:410-42. 
Krugman,  l?  1995. Growing world trade: Causes and consequences. Brookings Pa- 
pers on Economic Activity, no. l: 327-62. 
Lawrence, R., and M. Slaughter. 1993. International trade and U.S. wages in the 
1980s: Giant sucking sound or small hiccup? Brookings Papers on Economic Ac- 
tivity, Microeconomics, no. 2: 161-210. 
Learner, E. 1998. In search of Stolper-Samuelson linkages between international 
trade and lower wages. In Imports, exports, and the American worker, ed. Susan 
Collins, 141-214.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Maynard Smith, J.  1982. Evolution and the theory ofgames. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mishel, L. 1996. The state of working America. Washington, D.C.: Economic Pol- 
icy Institute. 
Reich, R. 1991. The work ofnations. New York: Basic Books. 
Spence, A. M.  1971. Market  signalling.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Stiglitz, J.  1975. The theory of “screening,” education, and the distribution of in- 
Press. 
come. American Economic Review 65:282-300. An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality  29 
Comment  James E. Rauch and Magnus Lofstrom 
We  begin with the empirical part of our discussion. We  take the basic 
empirical message of Krugman’s paper to be that the rise in the education 
wage premium is due to the choice by an increasing number of good work- 
ers to get a college education, which allows them to be distinguished from 
“bad” workers and therefore earn a higher wage. This lowers the average 
quality of noncollege-educated workers and, thus, raises the difference be- 
tween the wage  of  the educated and the noneducated. We  examine the 
implications of  Krugman’s hypothesis  for  the  contrast  between wage/ 
salary earners and the self-employed. The latter presumably earn their 
true productivity rather than being pooled by their employers. 
If education is only a signal and markets are perfect, there will  be no 
education-earnings differential  for  self-employed of  equal  ability. This 
might be true for individuals running small retail/wholesale trade or man- 
ufacturing establishments. On the other hand, the self-employed who pro- 
vide professional services benefit from having credentials. A self-employed 
accountant or stockbroker may only need innate ability and high school 
math, but has to get some formal education to obtain credentials (e.g., 
a CPA  degree). The earnings of these individuals are likely to be set by 
competition from large accountant and stockbroker firms. Suppose these 
individuals have exactly 16 years of schooling (we discuss postgraduate 
education later). In this case, when we  look at the earnings differential 
between self-employed workers with 16 years of schooling and 12 years of 
schooling, we  see a mix of a group for which the good agents have no 
incentive to sort themselves by obtaining an education’ and a group where 
good agents are able to earn a credential (equivalent to a signal); hence, 
we  should see a smaller wage  differential than for wagekalary earners, 
according to Krugman’s model. Over time, as more of the good individu- 
als choose to get a credential (signal), the education-wage differential in- 
creases for the self-employed as a whole, but not as much as for wage/ 
salary earners. Moreover, the earnings of the self-employed with 12 years 
of education increase relative to wagekalary earners with 12 years of edu- 
cation because the overall quality of the former group declines less.* 
We  will  perform  crude  tests  of  these hypotheses  by  examining log 
weekly earnings for wagekalary earners and the self-employed in 1980 and 
1990. Our sample consists of males ages 18 to 64 and is drawn from the 
James E. Rauch is professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego, and 
a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Magnus Lofstrom is a 
research associate of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany. 
1. Some may have obtained an education anyway, for its consumption value or perhaps 
because they anticipated wagehalary employment and switched to self-employment later in 
their working lives. 
2. We  are indebted to Alan Krueger for this last observation. 30  Paul Krugman 
Table lC.l  College-High School Earnings Differentials, Wagelsalary Earners 
versus Self-Employed 
Difference  , 
16 and 12 Years Education 





















Note: For row  1, earnings  = wage/salary income plus self-employment income for both 
groups.  For  row  2,  earnings  = wage/salary  income for  wagelsalary  workers and  self- 
employment income for the self-employed. 
U.S. census. Additional details are given in the appendix. Individuals are 
self-identified as wagehalary earners  or self-employed. In  tables  1  C.  1- 
1C.4, we  will  first  use  total  earnings  (wagehalary  earnings plus  self- 
employment earnings) for both groups and then use wagehalary earnings 
only for wagehalary earners and self-employment earnings only for the 
self-employed. We feel the latter earnings measures are more appropriate 
for testing the hypotheses. 
In table lC.l we  see that the earnings differential between males with 
16 versus 12 years of education is indeed higher for wagehalary earners 
than for the self-employed in all cases except for total earnings in  1980. 
More  importantly  for  Krugman’s main  point,  the  education  earnings 
differential increased more between 1980 and 1990 for wagehalary earners 
than for the self-employed regardless of which earnings measure is used. 
In table 1C.2 we  see that the earnings of the self-employed with 12 years 
of education improved compared to their wagehalary-earner counterparts 
between 1980 and 1990. All of these observations are consistent with Krug- 
man’s signaling model of increased earnings inequality. 
Often the rising wage inequality in the United States is cast as a rising 
return to ability. Thus, within demographic groups inequality has risen 
steadily since the late 1960s, as Katz and Murphy (1992) show. Table 1C.3 
shows no such rise among the self-employed during the  1980s when we 
control for a quartic in experience and years of education interacting with 
four education-level dummies, as in Katz and Murphy (1992, 44). As we An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality  31 
Table 1C.2  Earnings Differentials between Wagelsalary and Self-Employed 
Workers with 12 Years of Education 
Earnings 
Difference in Mean Log Wage 
between Self-Employed and 
Wagelsalary Earners 
Wagelsalary income + self- 
employment income 
1980  0.0647802 
1990  0.1164628 
Wagelsalary income for wagelsalary 
workers and self-employment 
income for the self-employed 
1980  -0.1210538 
1990  -0.0534281 
Table 1 C.3  Earnings Inequality for Wagelsalary Earners versus Self-Employed 
Difference, 
90th and 10th Percentiles  Variance 














































Note: For  row  1,  earnings  = wagelsalary income plus self-employment income for both 
groups.  For  row  2,  earnings  = wagelsalary  income for  wagelsalary  workers and  self- 
employment income for the self-employed. 
expect, the level of inequality among the self-employed is much greater 
than for wagekalary earners, reflecting greater  scope for ability in self- 
employment. Our interpretation of  table  1C.3 is that it supports Krug- 
man’s claim that nothing “real” happened to change the return to ability 
during the  1980s and that, instead, the increase in ability differentials 
among wagekalary earners probably reflects the breakdown of internal 
labor market rigidities, as suggested by Reich (1991). 
Finally, we  return to the education-wage differential, but include males 32  Paul Krugman 
Table 1C.4  College and Postgraduate-High  School Earnings Differentials, Wagel 
Salary Earners versus Self-Employed 
Difference in Mean Log Wage 






















Note:  For  row  1, earnings = wage/salary income plus self-employment income for both 
groups.  For  row  2,  earnings = wage/salary  income  for  wage/salary  workers  and  self- 
employment income for the self-employed. 
with postgraduate education. This group includes, for example, dentists 
and doctors who really could not perform their jobs without formal train- 
ing. We  see from table  1C.4 that the relationship between the earnings 
differential for wagekalary earners and the self-employed is essentially re- 
versed compared to table 1C.  1. This suggests that postgraduate education 
is truly productive and that there is greater scope for realizing returns to 
this productive education in self-employment. The increase in the educa- 
tion earnings premium for the self-employed is still smaller than for wage/ 
salary earners, however. 
We now turn to the theoretical part of our discussion. We find the weak- 
est element of Krugman’s model to be the human capital regime, in which 
the increased relative supply of educated workers drives down their rela- 
tive wages. Krugman  gets around the factor-price insensitivity theorem 
(Learner  1995) by  allowing relative prices to change as a result  of the 
United States being a large country. But this implies that a glut of college- 
educated  workers in the United  States, such as occurred  in  the  1970s, 
should lower returns to education everywhere else in the world to the same 
extent as in the United States. The real problem with traditional models 
is not the insensitivity of relative factor prices to changes in relative sup- 
plies of different kinds of factors, but rather insensitivity of relative factor 
prices for the same factor across countries to changes in relative country 
supplies. In other words, the relative country labor-demand curve is infi- 
nitely elastic for any given type of labor-the  relative country wage is fixed 
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One can solve this problem with traditional models by using different 
cones of specialization or moving beyond the two-by-two case. In keeping 
with the spirit of Krugman’s paper, however, let us consider a model with 
incomplete information, specifically that of Rauch and Casella (1998). In 
this model, information is incomplete in product markets rather than labor 
markets. Incomplete information is modeled as a matching problem: It is 
more difficult in international than in domestic markets for producers to 
find the right distributors for their consumer goods, assemblers to find the 
right suppliers for their components, investors to find the right partners 
for their joint ventures, and so on. Production takes place as follows: Pro- 
ducers match pairwise, and, if the match is acceptable, labor is employed 
to  realize the  productive  opportunity. Domestic  matching  takes  place 
subject  to  complete  information-every  producer  knows  the  type  of 
every other producer-while  international matching is effectively random. 
However, each producer has access only to the labor in his own country, 
so  domestic matches  must  employ domestic  labor, while  international 
matches can employ labor in whichever country it is cheapest. Interna- 
tional matches can thus serve to transfer labor demand from the country 
where labor is scarce to where it is abundant-the  price system at work. 
Although an informational barrier, such as a conventional trade barrier, 
is uniform across producers ex ante in this model, some producers may 
effectively evade it ex post if they are lucky in their international matching, 
If enough producers match successfully abroad, sufficient labor demand 
is transferred to equalize wages in the two countries. If the two countries’ 
producer-labor endowment ratios are far enough apart, however, lucky or 
good matches cannot transfer sufficient labor demand to equalize wages. 
Rather than being constant, as with a traditional trade barrier, the pro- 
portional wage gap will increase as the producer-labor endowment ratios 
move further apart: The relative labor-demand curve becomes downward- 
sloping.  However, a  country’s labor  force  is  not  fully  insulated  from 
changes in the labor endowment of its trading partner. As we move down 
the relative labor-demand  curve, some bad matches become acceptable 
because of the gains from trade provided by the increased wage differen- 
tial, generating an additional transfer of labor demand. Thus an increase 
in one country’s endowment of labor decreases wages in both countries, 
but decreases its own wage more.3 
This model offers a resolution to the “margins versus volumes” debate 
in the trade and wages controversy: Are choices made at the margin suffi- 
cient to equalize factor prices across various national markets, or is a cer- 
tain volume of trade across the markets necessary to drive prices to equal- 
3. In traditional models, a trade barrier that acts like a quota permits the equalization of 
wages when the quota is not binding, but when it is binding changes in countries’ endow- 
ments can only affect their own wages. 34  Paul Krugman 
ity? In a perfectly competitive world with no barriers to trade of any kind, 
this question is not well posed; if  prices did not equalize, the volume of 
trade required to equalize them would automatically occur. In the real 
world,  the  debate has  been  elegantly summarized  by  Freeman  (1995, 
If  the West can import children’s toys produced by  low-paid Chinese 
workers at bargain basement prices, surely low-skilled Westerners, who 
produce those toys at wages 10 times those of the Chinese, will face a 
difficult time in  the job market. It isn’t even necessary that the West 
import the toys. The threat to import them or to move plants to less- 
developed countries to produce the toys may suffice to force low-skilled 
Westerners to take a cut in pay to maintain employment. In this situa- 
tion, the open economy can cause lower pay for low-skilled workers 
even without trade: to save my job, I accept Chinese-level pay, and that 
prevents  imports.  The invisible hand  would  have done its job, with 
proper invisibility. . . . These predictions  [of factor-price equalization] 
run counter to a wide body of evidence that domestic developments do 
affect wages: for instance, that the baby boom affected the pay of young 
workers; that the relative number of college graduates altered the pre- 
mium paid for education. . . . 
Having recognized the theoretical point that competition from labor in 
low-wage countries could affect wages of comparably skilled labor in high- 
wage countries even in the absence of  any  actual trade, the empirical 
method  for quantifying such competition that is  preferred by  Freeman 
and many others (see, e.g., Sachs and Shatz 1994) remains factor content 
analysis: “if  the  United  States imported  10 additional  children’s toys, 
which could be produced by five American workers, the effective supply 
of  unskilled workers would increase by five. . . . This five-worker shift in 
the supply-demand balance would put pressure on unskilled wages to fall, 
causing those wages to fall in accord with the relevant elasticity” (Free- 
man 1995,23). Here the impact of low-wage competition depends entirely 
on the volume of net trade and not at all on the comparison of prices at 
the margin. 
In the model of Rauch and Casella under discussion, if the volume of 
international matches that are acceptable without wage differentials (the 
good matches) is sufficiently large, margins operate perfectly: Any incip- 
ient  rise  in  the  labor-scarce  country’s  wage  compared  to  the  labor- 
abundant country’s wage can be eliminated by  a shift in the labor de- 
manded by  these internationally matched producers from the former to 
2  1  -22):4 
4.  We might take the liberty of clarifying Freeman’s statement to state that the baby boom 
affected the pay of young workers more in the United States than in China and the relative 
number of college graduates in the United States altered the premium paid for education 
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the latter country. But if the volume of these good international matches is 
insufficient, margins operate imperfectly: The elimination of an incipient 
increase in the labor-scarce country’s wage effectively requires that this 
country’s producers shift from matching in a complete-information envi- 
ronment domestically to an incomplete-information environment abroad. 
When margins operate imperfectly, relative wages become a downward- 
sloping function of relative labor supplies in the two countries. In short, 
the efficient operation of margins is dependent on the adequate volume of 
good international matches, where the volume of these matches that is 
adequate is determined by the ratio of the factor endowments of the two 
countries. The actual volume of good matches is in turn determined by 
some combination of what could loosely be described as the model’s in- 
formation or matching technology  and familiarity between the trading 
partners. 
Appendix 
Sample Selection Criteria and Computation of  Weekly Earnings 
Data are drawn from the 1980 5 percent A sample and the 1990 5 percent 
sample of the U.S. Census of Population. All immigrants and a 20 percent 
random subsample of natives who satisfy the following criteria  are in- 
cluded: males between the ages of 18 and 64; not residing in group quar- 
ters; not in military service; not enrolled in school; reported working at 
least 40 weeks; earned at least $100 per week in 1989 dollars. Weights are 
used and adjusted accordingly (i.e., weights for natives are multiplied by 
5). Earnings reported in  tables  1C.1-lC.4  are weekly wages. These are 
calculated by dividing annual earnings by the number of weeks worked in 
the year prior to the census. The number of observations range from 4,498 
for self-employed males with 16 years of education in 1980 to 538,029 for 
wagelsalary workers in 1990. 
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